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 CHAPTER 15 
 THE RIGHT TO LIFE 
 william a.  schabas * 
 It is estimated that the two great wars of the twentieth century were responsible for 
the deaths of somewhere between 65 and 90 million persons. Th at is an average of 
between 17,599 and 24,200 deaths on every single day of the two confl icts. It should 
be borne in mind that the total population of the world at the time was about 
2 billion; it is 3.5 times that number today. A confl ict of similar scale today would 
bring deaths of about 60,000 to 75,000 people each day. If nothing else, these stag-
gering numbers show how much more civilized a place the world has become in 
recent decades, despite appearances and popular impressions. Several factors may 
explain this progress, including the emergence of international legal standards on 
human rights and the use of force and international mechanisms for their enforce-
ment and implementation. 1 
 In modern times, certainly, armed confl ict has posed one of the greatest threats 
to human life. Th e purpose of war may not be mass killing, but it is almost inevitably 
its consequence. Armed confl ict is therefore one of our era’s greatest challenges to 
the right to life. 
 *  OC MRIA, Professor of International Law, Middlesex University (London); Professor of 
International Criminal Law and Human Rights, Leiden University;  emeritus Professor of Human 
Rights Law, National University of Ireland Galway; and Honourary Chairman, Irish Centre for Human 
Rights. 
 1  For the analysis of a social scientist, see Steven Pinker,  Th e Better Angels of Our Nature: Th e Decline 
of Violence in History and Its Causes (London: Allen Lane, 2011). 
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 1  Origins and Scope of 
the Right to Life  
 Th e ‘right to life’ has been described as ‘the supreme right’, 2 ‘one of the most important 
rights’, 3 ‘the foundation and cornerstone of all the other rights’, 4 the ‘prerequisite for 
all other rights’, 5 ‘one of the rights which constitute the irreducible core of human 
rights’, 6 and a right which is ‘basic to all human rights’. 7 Yet basic as it appears, it is 
at the same time intangible in scope and vexingly diffi  cult to defi ne with precision. 
Perhaps more than any other, it is a right whose content is continuously evolving, in 
step with the hegemony of ever more progressive attitudes to capital punishment, 
nuclear arms, abortion, and euthanasia, to mention only a few of the many issues 
that interpreters of the right to life have addressed. 
 In positive law, probably the earliest recognition of this protection appears in the 
 Magna Carta :
 No freedman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold, or liberties, or 
free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed, nor will we pass upon 
him, nor condemn him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. 8 
 Declarations of the right to life are also found in a number of pre-revolutionary 
American documents, authored by Puritans who had fl ed religious persecution in 
England. For example, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties, which is prophetically 
dated 10 December 1641, proclaims: ‘No mans life shall be taken away [. . .] unlesse 
it be by bertue or equitie of some expresse law of the country narrating the same, 
established by a generall Cort and suffi  ciently published [. . .]’. 9 Th e Virginia Bill of 
Rights, draft ed by George Mason at the dawn of the American revolution, referred 
to ‘inherent rights’ to ‘the enjoyment of life’. 10 Th e Declaration of Independence 
 2  General Comment 6(16) , UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Add.1, also published as UN Doc A/37/40, Annex 
V, UN Doc CCPR/3/Add.1, 382–3. See also,  de Guerrero v Columbia (No 45/1979), UN Doc C/CCPR/
OP/1, 112 at 117. 
 3  ECtHR,  Stewart v United Kingdom (App No 10044/82), (1985) 7 EHRR 453. 
 4  Inter-American Commission of Human Rights,  Diez Años de Actividades, 1971–1981 , Washington, 
DC: Organization of American States, 1982, 339;  Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, 1986–1987 , OAS Doc OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71 doc 9 rev 1, 271. 
 5  ‘Initial Report of Uruguay’, UN Doc CCPR/C/1/Add.57. 
 6  ICJ,  Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion , ICJ Reports 1996, 226, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, 506. 
 7  General Comment 14(23) , UN Doc A/40/40, Annex XX, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.563, §1. 
 8  6 Halsbury’s Statutes (3rd edn) 401. 
 9  R. Perry and J. Cooper,  Sources of Our Liberties (Washington: American Bar Association, 1952), 148. 
 10  Perry and Cooper (n 9), 311. See also: Perry and Cooper (n 9), ‘Constitution of Pennsylvania’, 329; 
Perry and Cooper (n 9), ‘Constitution of Massachusetts’, 374; Perry and Cooper (n 9), ‘Constitution of 
New Hampshire’, 382. 
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followed by a few weeks: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’ Article 5 of 
the American Bill of Rights states that no person shall ‘be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law’. 
 Th e post- World War I period was seminal for the development of international 
law, including the international law of human rights. It provides what appears to 
be the fi rst recognition in treaty law of the right to life. Article 2 of the agreement 
establishing Poland declares:  ‘Poland undertakes to assure full and complete pro-
tection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Poland without distinction of birth, 
nationality, language, race or religion’. 11 A similar provision is found in the treaty 
establishing Yugoslavia. 12 Th ese texts appear to have inspired the Institut de droit 
international, which adopted an international declaration of human rights at its 
meeting held at Briarcliff  Manor, New York in 1929. Article I of that declaration recog-
nizes the right to life: ‘It is the duty of every State to recognize the equal right of every 
individual to life, liberty and property, and to accord to all within its territory the full 
and entire protection of this right, without distinction as to nationality, sex, language, 
or religion.’ 13 René Cassin credited the Institut de droit international with playing an 
important role in the history of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, noting in 
particular that the right to life was included as part of the 1929 Declaration. 14 
 Inexorably, then, the right to life took a prominent position in the fi rst proposals 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that were considered by the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights in 1947 and 1948. A  study of national 
constitutions conducted by John Humphrey for the Commission found 26 provi-
sions in various national constitutions that recognized a right to life. 15 Based on 
these materials, Humphrey proposed the following in his 48-article initial draft : 
‘Everyone has the right to life. Th is right can be denied only to persons who have 
been convicted under general law of some crime to which the death penalty is 
attached.’ 16 When the provision was fi rst discussed in the Draft ing Committee, Eleanor 
 11  Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, 
and Poland [1919] TS 8. 
 12  Treaty of Peace between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene 
State [1919] TS 17, Art 2.  Also:  Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and 
Roumania (1921) 5 LNTS 336, Art 1; Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and 
Czechoslovakia [1919] TS 20, Art 1. Article 63 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye [1919] TS 11, 
protects ‘life and liberty, without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion’. 
 13  Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international , vol II (Brussels: Goemaere, 1929), 118–20; the original 
is in French, but an English version was published many years later: Institut de droit international, 
‘Declaration of International Rights of Man’ (1941) 35  American Journal of International Law  663. 
 14  René Cassin, ‘La déclaration universelle et la mise en oeuvre des droits de l’homme’, (1951) 79 
 Receuil des cours 241 at 272. 
 15  UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.1, 14–19. 
 16  UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.1, 14; E/CN.4/AC.1/3, 2; UN Doc E/CN.4/21, Annex A. 
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Roosevelt remarked ‘that she understood that there is a movement underway in 
some States to wipe out the death penalty completely. She suggested that it might be 
better not to use the phrase death penalty’. 17 Other members joined in the view that 
the Declaration should not appear to sanction capital punishment. 18 René Cassin 
reworked the text and, aft er further discussion in the Draft ing Committee, agree-
ment on the following text was reached: ‘Every human being has the right to life, 
to personal liberty and to personal security.’ 19 Th e provision underwent only minor 
subsequent changes. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration, adopted on 10 December 
1948, reads: ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.’ 20 
 Th e treaty formulations of the right to life are more complex. In the European 
Convention on Human Rights there is an enumeration of specifi c exceptions, such 
as self-defence and quelling a riot or insurrection. 21 Th e draft ers of the European 
Convention specifi cally contemplated the issue of the right to life in armed con-
fl ict by allowing its derogation ‘in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of 
war’. 22 Th e International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 23 the American 
Convention on Human Rights, 24 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights 25 eschew attempts to enumerate exceptions to the right to life other than the 
death penalty. Instead, they declare that no one shall be ‘arbitrarily’ deprived of 
the right to life. Even the European Court of Human Rights has in eff ect interpreted 
the right to life as ensuring that life is not deprived ‘arbitrarily’. 
 Th e right to life has many dimensions. Some of them, such as the question of 
when the right to life begins (abortion) and whether the right can be waived (suicide) 
seem to have little or no connection with issues of armed confl ict. On the other 
hand, three issues are relevant in this context: (i) the relationship between the right 
to life as set out in international human rights law and international humanitarian 
law; (ii) the interplay between the norms on capital punishment as they appear in 
both the international humanitarian law treaties and the human rights treaties; 26 
(iii) the impact on the right to life of the rules of international law on the recourse 
to armed force. Each of these issues is examined in turn. 
 17  UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.2, 10.    18  UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.2, 10–11. 
 19  UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/W.2/Rev.2; UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.12; Annex F of UN Doc E/CN.4/21. 
 20  GA Res 217 A (III), UN Doc A/810. 
 21  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1955) 213 UNTS 221, 
Art 2(2). 
 22  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1955) 213 UNTS 221, 
Art 15(2). 
 23  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976) 999 UNTS 171, Art 6. 
 24  American Convention on Human Rights (1979) 1144 UNTS 123. 
 25  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1986) 520 UNTS 217, Art 4. 
 26  Several protocols to the right to life provisions have been adopted with the aim of abolishing 
capital punishment. Generally, they acknowledge the special circumstances of armed confl ict by con-
templating the possibility of capital punishment in time of war. See  Protocol No. 6 to the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death 
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 2  The HR Provisions on the 
Right to Life and IHL  
 In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of 
Justice confi rmed the application of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights—and, by implication, other relevant provisions, such as Article 
3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and equivalent texts in regional 
human rights treaties—in wartime. According to the Advisory Opinion, the pro-
tection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) does 
not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby 
certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. 1 Respect 
for the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not 
to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities. 27 Logically, then, 
other instruments that do not contemplate derogation at all, such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, must be applicable during armed confl ict as well as 
in peacetime. 
 If intentional deprivation of life is very much the exception in peacetime, it would 
seem to be the rule during wartime. Yet the law of armed confl ict is also largely 
concerned with the protection of human life, at a time when it is most in peril. 
For example, the Hague Regulations prohibit the random and arbitrary execution 
of prisoners of war 28 and, when military authority is exercised over the territory 
of the hostile state, ‘the lives of persons [. . .] must be respected’. 29 Th e 1949 Geneva 
Conventions set out similar norms. Explaining the absence of a reference to protection 
of life similar to that found in the Hague Regulations, the authoritative  Commentary 
to the Geneva Conventions states:
 What about the right to life itself? Unlike Article 46 of the Hague Regulations the present 
Article does not mention it specifi cally. It is nevertheless obvious that this right is implied, 
for without it there would be no reason for the other rights mentioned. Th is is a simple 
conclusion  a majori ad minus, and is confi rmed by the existence of clauses prohibiting 
murder, reprisals and the taking of hostages, in Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Convention. 
Penalty , ETS no 114, Art 2;  Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights Aimed at Abolition of the Death Penalty (1991) 1642 UNTS 414, Art 2(1);  Additional Protocol to 
the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty , OASTS 73, Art 2(1). Only one 
of these instruments prohibits the death penalty at all times:  Protocol No 13 to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in 
all circumstances , ETS no 187, Art 2. 
 27  ICJ,  Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion , ICJ Reports 1996, 226, § 25. 
 28  Convention Regulating the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare (Hague Convention No IV), 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of Land War , 3 Martens (3rd) 461, 2  AJIL Supp 2 [1910] 
TS 9, Art 23. 
 29  [1910] TS 9, Art 46. 
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Furthermore, the death penalty may only be applied to protected persons under the 
circumstances strictly laid down in Article 68. 30 
 As the  Commentary explains, the Geneva Conventions contain explicit guarantees 
for the lives of protected persons. Article 12 common to the fi rst two Conventions, 
which concerns wounded, sick, and shipwrecked combatants, states: ‘Any attempts 
upon their lives, or violence to their persons, shall be strictly prohibited; in particular, 
they shall not be murdered or exterminated, subjected to torture or to biological 
experiments; they shall not wilfully be left  without medical assistance and care, 
nor shall conditions exposing them to contagion or infection be created.’ 31 All of 
the Conventions treat the wilful killing of protected persons as grave breaches. 32 
Th e application of these principles has been upheld in an important ruling of the 
European Court of Human Rights. 33 More than half of a recent study on the right to 
life is devoted to situations of armed confl ict. Th e specifi c issues addressed include 
collateral damage, the status of prisoners, so-called unlawful combatants during 
military occupation, and targeted killings. 34 
 In addition to non-combatants and combatants who are  hors de combat , the law 
of armed confl ict also protects the right to life of those who directly participate 
in hostilities. Th e International Committee of the Red Cross has reinforced the 
view that even combatants benefi t from a right to life, to the extent that ‘the kind 
and degree of force which is permissible against persons not entitled to protec-
tion against direct attack must not exceed what is actually necessary to accomplish 
a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing circumstances’. 35 Its position fi nds 
support in the work of Jean Pictet, who wrote: ‘If we can put a soldier out of action 
by capturing him, we should not wound him; if we can obtain the same result by 
wounding him, we must not kill him. If there are two means to achieve the same 
military advantage, we must choose the one which causes the lesser evil’. 36 Along 
similar lines, Hersch Lauterpacht wrote that the law on conduct of hostilities ‘must 
be shaped—so far as it can be shaped at all—by reference not to existing law but 
to more compelling considerations of humanity, of the survival of civilization, and 
of the sanctity of the individual human being’. 37 Such conclusions fl ow inexorably 
 30  O.M. Uhler et al,  Commentary IV (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958), 201 
(hereinaft er: ‘ Commentary ’). 
 31  Article 12 of GC I; Art 12 of GC II. 
 32  Article 49 of GC I; Art 50 ofGC II; Art 129 of GC III; Art 146 of GC IV. 
 33  ECtHR,  Kononov v Latvia [GC], no 36376/04, Judgment, 17 May 2010, §§ 202–204. 
 34  C. Tomuschat, E.  Lagrange, and S.  Oeter (eds),  Th e Right to Life (Leiden/Boston:  Martinus 
Nijhoff , 2010). 
 35  ‘Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 90  International Review of the Red Cross 991 at 1040–4. 
 36  Jean Pictet,  Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff , 1985), 75 ff . 
 37  Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Th e Problem of the Revision of the Law of War’ (1952) 29  British Yearbook 
of International Law 360 at 379. 
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from the earliest codifi cations of the law of armed confl ict, the 1868 Declaration of 
St Petersburg and the 1899 Martens Clause. 38 
 Th e broader issue of the rapport between human rights law and the law of armed 
confl ict cannot be avoided here. In its celebrated decision on jurisdiction, the 
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
set out ‘the more recent and comprehensive notion of “international humanitar-
ian law”, which has emerged as a result of the infl uence of human rights doctrines 
on the law of armed confl ict’. 39 Th ere is in fact a mild degree of reciprocity because 
the law of armed confl ict has contributed to the development of certain human 
rights norms, notably in the fi eld of capital punishment. Vera Gowlland-Debbas has 
written of the ‘humanisation’ of international humanitarian law and the ‘humani-
tarisation’ of international human rights law. 40 Some modern legal instruments 
bridge the divide, incorporating elements from both bodies of law; for example, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 41 and the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. 42 
 Nevertheless, as Dietrich Schindler has explained, ‘[h] uman rights and the law 
of war evolved along entirely diff erent and totally separate lines, but their spiritual 
roots may be traced in part to the same origin and, from the nineteenth century, 
a certain degree of similarity may be observed in the development of each’. 43 Th ere 
was initial reluctance to address issues relating to the legal regulation of armed con-
fl ict within the United Nations, a fact that helps to explain why the relationship 
between the two bodies of law was sometimes not explicitly considered in early 
human rights instruments. In 1949, the International Law Commission declined to 
study the laws of war. Several of its members considered the subject to be incompat-
ible with the principles and purposes of the United Nations. 44 For example, James 
L. Brierly said that the Commission should ‘refrain from taking up the question 
 38  See Nils Melzer, ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ 
(2010) 42  International Law and Politics 831; Ryan Goodman, ‘Th e Power to Kill or Capture Enemy 
Combatants’ (2013)  European Journal of International Law (forthcoming). 
 39  ICTY,  Tadi ć (IT-94-1-AR72), Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, § 87. 
 40  V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Th e Right to Life and the Relationship between Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law’, in C. Tomuschat, E. Lagrange, and S. Oeter (eds),  Th e Right to Life (Leiden/Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff , 2010), 123–50 at 126–8. 
 41  (1990) 1577 UNTS 3.    42  (2002) 2187 UNTS 90. 
 43  D. Schindler, ‘Th e International Committee of the Red Cross and Human Rights’, 203  International 
Review of the Red Cross (1979) 3. Also L. Doswald-Beck and S. Vité, ‘International Humanitarian Law 
and Human Rights Law’, 293  International Review of the Red Cross (1993) 94; Robert Kolb, ‘Aspects 
historiques de la relation entre le droit international humanitaire et les droits de l’homme’, 37  Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law (1999) 57; ‘Working paper on the relationship between human rights 
law and international humanitarian law by F. Hampson and I. Salama’, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/14, 
§§ 41–4. 
 44  UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.6, §§ 45–67. 
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of the laws of war because if it did so its action might be interpreted as a lack of 
confi dence in the United Nations and the work of peace which the latter was called 
upon to carry out’. 45 
 Th is began to change with the 1968 Tehran Conference on Human Rights. 
Anti-colonial and liberation struggles, as well as the Vietnam war and the civil 
confl ict in Nigeria, had placed war at the centre of the agenda for civil society. Th e 
Conference adopted a celebrated resolution on human rights in armed confl ict. It 
began by affi  rming that ‘peace is the underlying condition for the full observance 
of human rights and war is their negation’, noting that ‘nevertheless armed con-
fl icts continue to plague humanity’. Th e Resolution called for observance of 
humanitarian norms during armed confl ict, a view that was affi  rmed in a General 
Assembly resolution later the same year. 46 
 But as successive generations of scholars, experts, and activists began to peel 
this onion, layers of complexity and diffi  culty that had not previously been con-
templated began to emerge. Th ere have been attempts to merge the two bodies of 
law, or at least to ensure that they are viewed as consistent components of a larger 
whole. Th is rather holistic view was taken by the International Court of Justice in its 
Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons. It declared that for the purposes of deter-
mining the scope of the right to life in armed confl ict, the law of armed confl ict 
was the  lex specialis . Th us, the right to protection of life from arbitrary deprivation 
applies also in hostilities. However, according to the Court, the test of what is an 
arbitrary deprivation of the right to life then falls to be determined by the applicable 
 lex specialis , namely, the law applicable in armed confl ict which is designed to regu-
late the conduct of hostilities. Whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a 
certain weapon in warfare, for example, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation 
of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant can only be decided by reference to the 
law applicable in armed confl ict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant 
itself. 47 From this perspective, the law of armed confl ict may appear to constitute a 
limit to the application of human rights norms. 
 Th e  lex specialis formulation used by the ICJ in the  Nuclear Weapons case to 
describe the relationship between the right to life as set out in human rights law 
and the law of armed confl ict was clumsy at best. In the Advisory Opinion in  Th e 
Wall case, the ICJ proposed a more nuanced gloss on its earlier pronouncement. 
It described the relationship between international human rights law and interna-
tional humanitarian law as follows:
 More generally, the Court considers that the protection off ered by human rights conventions 
does not cease in case of armed confl ict, save through the eff ect of provisions for derogation 
 45  UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.6, § 55. 
 46  Respect for Human Rights in Armed Confl icts. Resolution 2444 (XXIII) of the United Nations 
General Assembly, 19 December 1968. 
 47  ICJ,  Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion , ICJ Reports 1996, 226, § 25. 
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of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human 
rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of 
international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet 
others may be matters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the 
question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of inter-
national law, namely human rights law and, as  lex specialis , international humanitarian law. 48 
 Th is statement is not incompatible with the dictum in  Nuclear Weapons , but it 
is not  identical to it either. In  Nuclear Weapons , the ICJ stated that international 
humanitarian law is the window through which arbitrary deprivation of life in 
armed confl ict is to be examined, but it did not develop the discussion with respect 
to other human rights that may be at issue during armed confl ict. In the  Wall case, 
the Court seemed to withdraw from what appears to be as a rather too absolute 
statement. According to Professor Hampson, the above citation from the the  Wall 
case makes it ‘clear that  lex specialis is not being used to displace [human rights law]. 
It is rather an indication that human rights bodies should interpret a human rights 
norm in the light of [the law of armed confl ict/international humanitarian law]’. 49 
 In the case of  Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda , the Court again con-
sidered the concrete application of these principles. It repeated the paragraph cited 
above from the advisory opinion on the  Wall. 50 Determining that Uganda was an 
Occupying Power in Ituri during the relevant period, it said that Article 43 of the 
Hague Regulations of 1907 imposed an obligation ‘to secure respect for the appli-
cable rules of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, 
to protect the inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence, and not 
to tolerate such violence by any third party’. 51 It said that Uganda’s international 
responsibility was engaged ‘for any lack of vigilance in preventing violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law by other actors present in the 
occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own account’. 52 In addi-
tion, ‘Uganda at all times has responsibility for all actions and omissions of its own 
military forces in the territory of the DRC in breach of its obligations under the 
rules of international human rights law and international humanitarian law which 
are relevant and applicable in the specifi c situation’. 53 In eff ect, then, the Court did 
not address a possible confl ict between the two systems, or suggest that violations of 
 48  ICJ,  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion , 9 July 2004, § 106. 
 49  ‘Working paper on the relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian 
law by F. Hampson and I. Salama’, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/14, § 57. 
 50  ICJ,  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) , 
19 December 2005, § 216. 
 51  Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda (n 50), § 178. 
 52  Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda (n 50), § 179. 
 53  Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda (n 50)., § 180. 
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international human rights law would be examined through the lens of international 
humanitarian law. Rather, it treated them as two complementary systems, as parts 
of a whole. 
 When the right to life is concerned, in many cases the result will be the same 
whether it is the law of armed confl ict or human rights law that governs. In other 
words, the  lex specialis issue need not arise at all. For example, to the extent that 
it is deemed impermissible to kill a combatant when lesser means of rendering 
that person  hors de combat may be employed, there is probably no tension what-
soever between the two bodies of law. However, as will be discussed later in this 
chapter, to the extent that human rights law may condemn any unlawful resort to 
armed force, there will be a confl ict with international humanitarian law which 
espouses an indiff erence as to the responsibility of one or another party for the 
war itself. 
 3  Capital Punishment  
 Th e progressive restriction and abolition of capital punishment has been one of the 
central themes of modern human rights law. Arguably, it is one of the great success 
stories of the modern human rights movement. When the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights was adopted in 1948, only a handful of states had abandoned capital 
punishment. Th e international community sentenced several men to death aft er 
they were condemned by the fi rst international criminal tribunals, in Nuremberg 
and Tokyo. Six decades later, more than three-quarters of United Nations member 
states are considered abolitionist, according to the quinquennial studies produced 
by the Secretary-General. 54 More than 80 states have confi rmed their abolitionist 
stance by ratifying one of the treaties or protocols, thereby binding themselves on 
this issue as a matter of international obligation. 55 
 Th e 1929 Prisoner of War Convention was the fi rst multilateral international 
instrument to deal with the imposition of capital punishment. 56 It set out two prin-
ciples with respect to the death penalty: notifi cation of the sentence to the prisoner’s 
government (via the protecting power) and a moratorium on execution of the sen-
tence for the three months following sentencing, in order to permit political and 
 54  ‘Capital punishment and implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights 
of those facing the death penalty’, UN Doc E/2010/10, 7. 
 55  UN Doc E/2010/10 (n 54), 30–2. 
 56  International Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1932–33) 118 LNTS 343. 
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diplomatic eff orts at obtaining commutation or reprieve. 57 One of the military 
tribunals that sat in Nuremberg following World War II held that ‘most of the pro-
visions’ of the 1929 Geneva Convention were ‘an expression of the accepted views of 
civilized nations’ and therefore norms of customary international law. 58 
 Th e treaty was substantially revised and made more stringent in the 1949 
Convention with respect to the imposition of the death penalty on prisoners of 
war. 59 But probably of more consequence were the provisions adopted in the civilian 
convention, for which there was no predecessor or precedent. According to Claude 
Pilloud of the International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘[a] ft er the second world 
war a very strong feeling arose against the numerous death sentences infl icted on 
inhabitants of occupied territories and there was a general desire that the possibility 
of infl icting capital punishment should be as restricted as possible’. 60 In this debate, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross made no secret of its real intention 
and ultimate objective: abolition of the death penalty. 61 
 Th e fourth Geneva Convention (GC IV) contains important innovations: a severe 
restriction on the crimes for which the death penalty may be imposed and a total 
prohibition on the execution of juvenile off enders. 62 Th e latter measure resulted 
from a proposal at the Seventeenth International Conference of the Red Cross by 
the International Union for the Protection of Children and recognizes the principle 
that children are not fully responsible for their actions, either because of immaturity 
or because of coercion. 63 According to the authoritative  Commentary , ‘[t] he clause 
corresponds to similar provisions in the penal codes of many countries, and is based 
on the idea that a person who has not reached the age of eighteen years is not fully 
capable of sound judgment, does not always realize the signifi cance of his actions 
and oft en acts under the infl uence of others, if not under constraint’. 64 
 In addition, Article 75 of GC IV grants a right to petition for pardon or reprieve to 
all persons condemned to death. Th e death sentence may not be carried out before 
expiration of a period of at least six months from the date the protecting power 
 57  Report on the Work of the Conference of Government Experts for the Study of the Conventions 
for the Protection of War Victims (Geneva, 14–26 April 1947) , Series I, no 5b (Geneva:  International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 1947), 231. 
 58  Th e High Command Case (US v Von Leeb) , (1950) 11 TWC 462, 535. 
 59  Articles 87, 100, 101, 107 of GC III. 
 60  C. Pilloud, ‘Reservations to the Geneva Conventions of 1949’ [1976]  International Review of the 
Red Cross 163 at 184–5. 
 61  Report on the Work of the Conference of Government Experts for the Study of the Conventions for the 
Protection of War Victims (Geneva, 14–26 April 1947) , Series I, no 5b (Geneva: International Committee 
of the Red Cross, 1947), 231;  Remarks and Proposals Submitted by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, Document for the Consideration of Governments Invited by the Swiss Federal Council to Attend the 
Diplomatic Conference at Geneva (April 21, 1949) (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 
1949), 75. 
 62  Articles 68 and 75 of GC IV. 
 63  O. Uhler et al,  Commentary IV (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958), 371–2. 
 64  Uhler et al (n 63), 371–2. 
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receives notifi cation of the fi nal judgment confi rming the sentence or an order 
denying pardon or reprieve. Th e Diplomatic Conference modifi ed the Stockholm 
draft  somewhat, providing for a reduction of the six-month moratorium in individual 
cases, under circumstances of grave emergency involving the security of the occu-
pying power or its forces. 65 However, even in such cases, the protecting power must 
receive prior notifi cation and be given reasonable time and opportunity to make 
representations on the subject. 66 
 Besides the specifi c provisions concerning capital punishment in GC III and 
GC IV, Common Article 3 prohibits ‘the passing of sentences and the carrying out 
of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court, aff ording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable 
by civilized peoples’. 67 Although ostensibly applicable to non-international armed 
confl icts not otherwise governed by the Conventions themselves, these provisions 
are now held to be applicable to international armed confl icts as well. 68 According 
to the ICJ, Common Article 3 is a ‘minimum yardstick’ expressing ‘elementary 
considerations of humanity’. 69 Although the judicial guarantees cited in Common 
Article 3 are not elaborated upon, such instruments as Article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 70 the ‘Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection 
of the Rights of Th ose Facing the Death Penalty’, 71 and Article 75(4) of Additional 
Protocol I (AP I) 72 provide an indication of what is ‘recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples’. 
 Th e 1977 Additional Protocols go somewhat further in the limitation of capital 
punishment than the 1949 Geneva Conventions, refl ecting an evolution within the 
human rights sphere. Th ey extend the prohibition on execution of juvenile off end-
ers to all persons ‘in the power of a party to the confl ict’ and not only to ‘protected 
persons’, as is the case with the fourth Convention. 73 According to the Commentary 
on Article 77(5) of AP I, ‘it can be said that the death penalty for persons under 
 65  Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 , vol IIA (Bern: Federal Political 
Department, 1949)  (Summary record of eighteenth meeting of Committee III), 675; Summary 
record of forty-third meeting of Committee III, 771; Report of Committee III, 835);  Final Record of 
the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 , vol III (Bern: Federal Political Department 1949), 144–5 
(Annex 310);  Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 , vol IIB (Bern:  Federal 
Political Department, 1949) (Minutes of the twenty-eighth plenary meeting), 439. 
 66  Article 75 of GC IV. 
 67  Article 3 of GC IV. See R. Sapienza, ‘International Legal Standards on Capital Punishment’, in 
Bertrand G. Ramcharan (ed),  Th e Right to Life in International Law (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff , 1985), 
284–96 at 293. 
 68  ICTY,  Delalic et al (IT-96-21-A), Judgment, 20 February 2001, § 150. 
 69  ICJ,  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) 
[1986] ICJ Reports 14, § 218. 
 70  (1976) 999 UNTS 171.    71  ESC Res 1984/50. Subsequently endorsed by GA Res 39/118. 
 72  Article 75(4) of AP I. 
 73  Article 77(5) of AP I. For non-international armed confl ict, the same norm applies: see Art 6(5) 
of AP II. 
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eighteen years of age is ruled out completely’. 74 Probably inspired by evolving norms 
in human rights treaties, to which reference is made in the  travaux préparatoires , 75 
the Additional Protocols also prohibit capital punishment for pregnant women. 
Th ey actually improve upon human rights norms in force at the time, to an extent, 
by also banning executions of mothers following childbirth. AP I prohibits exe-
cution of ‘mothers having dependent infants’. 76 Curiously, Additional Protocol II 
(AP II), which applies to non-international armed confl ict, appears to go further 
than AP I  by prohibiting execution of ‘mothers of young children’. Th ere is no 
real explanation for the inconsistency, aside from the occasional incoherence that 
inevitably occurs from time to time in complex treaty negotiations, where diff erent 
working groups operate in parallel, with a shortage of time at the end of the process 
so as to ensure consistency. 
 It is in the area of juvenile executions where the synergy between human rights 
law and the law of armed confl ict may be most visible. Th e provision in GC IV pro-
hibiting the death penalty for protected persons who were under 18 at the time of 
the off ence, very evidently inspired human rights lawmakers in the United Nations 
system. Th ey agreed to incorporate the norm in a draft  of the ICCPR during the 1957 
session of the Th ird Committee of the General Assembly. 77 It became Article 6(5) 
in the fi nal version of the Covenant, adopted in 1966: ‘Sentence of death shall not 
be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age [. . .]’. An 
essentially identical provision is found in Article 4(5) of the American Convention 
on Human Rights, which was adopted in 1969. 
 In 1987, two petitioners before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
invoked Article 68(4) of GC IV, arguing that it informed the right to life article of the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Th e American Declaration 
was adopted in 1948, several months prior to the Universal Declaration, and contains 
a very general formulation of the right to life without reference to the death penalty 
(‘Every human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his person’). Th e 
issue was whether the prohibition of juvenile executions was implied within the text of 
Article I of the Declaration. In accordance with the law of the Inter-American human 
 74  Claude Pilloud and Jean Pictet, ‘Article 77—Protection of Children’, in Yves Sandoz, Christophe 
Swinarksi, and Bruno Zimmermann (eds),  Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff , 1987), 897–905 at 904. 
 75  ICRC Doc CDDH/I/SR.64, § 42. Similar views were expressed by Japan:  ICRC Doc CDDH/I/
SR.64, § 82. See also A. Eide, ‘Th e New Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Confl ict’, 
in A. Cassese (ed),  Th e New Humanitarian Law of Armed Confl ict, I (Naples: Editoriale Scientifi ca, 
1979), 276–309, 286. Th e  Commentary on  Protocol Additional II suggests some guidance in constru-
ing the term can be obtained from the fourth Convention, Art 14 §1, which refers to mothers of chil-
dren under seven years old, and  Protocol Additional I , Art 8, which uses the narrower term ‘new-born 
babies’:  Sylvie-Stoyanka Junod, ‘Article 6—Fundamental guarantees’, in Yves Sandoz, Christophe 
Swinarksi, and Bruno Zimmermann (eds),  Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff , 1987), 1395–1402 at 1402. 
 76  Article 76(3) of AP I.    77  UN Doc A/C.3/SR.820, § 25. 
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rights system, petitions based upon compliance with the American Declaration may 
be lodged against states that have not ratifi ed the American Convention on Human 
Rights, where the prohibition on such executions is explicit. 
 Th e two petitioners made the following submission:
 As of January 1, 1986 there are 162 states parties to [the Geneva Conventions], including the 
United States. Th is Convention applies to periods of international armed confl ict and Article 
68 forbids the execution of civilians and military personnel no longer in combat, who com-
mitted off enses prior to the age of 18. If nearly all the nations of the world, including the 
United States, have agreed to such a norm for periods of international armed confl ict, the 
norm protecting juvenile off enders from execution ought to apply with even greater force 
for periods of peace. 78 
 Th e United States responded that GC IV applies only in international armed con-
fl icts, and therefore cannot be applied for the execution of juveniles in the United 
States in normal times and in the absence of an international confl ict. 79 Th e 
Commission did not expressly respond to the Geneva Convention argument, but it 
said it was ‘convinced by the U.S. Government’s argument that there does not now 
exist a norm of customary international law establishing 18 to be the minimum age 
for imposition of the death penalty’. 80 Apparently, the Commission was infl uenced 
by the argument that the norms in GC IV concerning the human rights of pro-
tected persons in occupied territories could not automatically be transposed to a 
more general context. Certainly there is some merit to this position. State practice 
in 1949, when GC IV was adopted, and at a time when many states still conducted 
executions for juvenile crimes, must be borne in mind. Surely the draft ers of GC IV 
did not consider that the norms they were adopting would also apply to their own 
territories in peacetime. If that had been the issue, they would probably never have 
accepted Article 68 of the Geneva Convention. 
 By 2002, the views of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
had evolved. Reconsidering the issue it had contemplated 15  years earlier, the 
Commission said it could ‘identify no appropriate justifi cation for applying a more 
restrictive standard for the application of the death penalty to juveniles in times of 
occupation than in times of peace, relating as this protection does to the most basic 
and non-derogable protections for human life and dignity of adolescents that are 
common to both regimes of international law’. 81 Th e Inter-American Commission’s 
fi nding was premised upon the idea that if a norm is important enough in wartime, 
it ought also to apply in peacetime. Th e opposite proposition, namely that stand-
ards of humane treatment in wartime will be lower than those in peacetime, seems 
 78  Roach and Pinkerton v United States , Resolution No 3/87, Case No 9647, 22 September 1987, § 36(g). 
 79  See  Roach and Pinkerton v United States , Dissenting Opinion of Dr Marco Garado Monroy Cabra, 
22 September 1987. 
 80  Roach and Pinkerton v United States , Resolution No 3/87, Case No 9647, 22 September 1987, § 60. 
 81  Domingues v United States , Report No 62/02, Merits, Case 12.285, 22 October 2002, § 67. 
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almost intuitive. Perhaps for that reason, the Inter-American Commission thought 
it made sense to take the logic in the other direction. 
 4  Jus Ad Bellum and the Right to Life  
 Unlike torture, where the prohibition by international law has been held to be abso-
lute, 82 the right to life is not envisaged in the same uncompromised manner. In 
addition to capital punishment, under certain circumstances, other examples of 
widely-recognized exceptions to or limitations upon the right to life can be found. 
Examples include killing in self-defence and the lethal use of force by the authorities 
in order to prevent crime. Th ese are either set out explicitly, as is the case in Article 2 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, or are subsumed within the concept 
of ‘arbitrary deprivation’, leaving the court to clarify their scope. General principles 
dictate that these exceptions or limitations follow the same general approach as in 
the case of other human rights norms, as clarifi ed in the case law of bodies like the 
European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee. Th ey 
must be established by law, serve a legitimate purpose and have a reasonable rela-
tionship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to 
be achieved. Where lethal force is employed, it must be ‘no more than absolutely 
necessary in defence of persons from unlawful violence’. 83 
 Th e legal situation may be diff erent in the case of armed confl ict, or so it is con-
tended. When the International Court of Justice declared that the determination of 
arbitrary deprivation of life during wartime should be assessed with reference to 
the  lex specialis , namely international humanitarian law, it seemed to be implying 
that the rules of  jus ad bellum— that is, the rules of international law regulating the 
legality of recourse to armed force in international relations—were irrelevant to the 
assessment. It is beyond real debate that international humanitarian law does not 
concern itself with  jus ad bellum . It attempts to confront both sides in a confl ict as 
equals, without regard to whether one or the other party has a just cause or is acting 
unlawfully. Th ere is considerable wisdom in the approach taken by international 
humanitarian law, because this neutrality facilitates the eff ectiveness of bodies that 
intervene in order to mitigate violations, such as the International Committee of the 
Red Cross. It is conceivable that an aggressor, acting unlawfully and in breach of  jus 
 82  Gäfgen v Germany [GC] (no 22978/05), Judgment, 1 June 2010, § 87. 
 83  ECtHR,  McCann et al v  United Kingdom [GC], Series A, vol 324, § 213. 
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ad bellum , may scrupulously respect the  jus in bello. Likewise, it is also possible that 
a combatant force fi ghting a just war may commit atrocities. 84 
 Th e anti-war dimension of international humanitarian law is sometimes forgot-
ten. Yet the preamble of the 1907 Hague Convention begins with these words: ‘Seeing 
that, while seeking means to preserve peace and prevent armed confl icts between 
nations, it is likewise necessary to bear in mind the case where the appeal to arms 
has been brought about by events which their care was unable to avert [. . .]’. It may 
therefore be overstating things slightly to suggest that international humanitarian 
law is purely and exclusively focused on  jus in bello. Article 1 of AP I admits a special 
regime applicable to ‘armed confl icts which peoples are fi ghting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their 
right of self-determination’. 85 In addition, it has been held, by the International 
Court of Justice, that norms of humanitarian law relative to the use of weapons 
that cause unnecessary suff ering or superfl uous harm, or are indiscriminate, do not 
apply strictly in the case of a country placed in an extreme situation of self-defence. 86 
But these are really the exceptions that confi rm the general rule of the neutrality of 
international humanitarian law with respect to the responsibility of one or other of 
the combatant parties for a breach of the law on the use of force. 
 Th e view that international human rights should also profess indiff erence to  jus 
ad bellum has been adopted by important non-governmental organizations. During 
the negotiations proceeding the adoption of amendments to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court enabling the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression, Human Rights Watch said that its 
 institutional mandate includes a position of strict neutrality on issues of  jus ad bellum , 
because we fi nd it the best way to focus on the conduct of war, or  jus in bello , and thereby 
to promote our primary goal of encouraging all parties to a confl ict to respect international 
humanitarian law. Consistent with this approach, we take no position on the substance of a 
defi nition of the crime of aggression. 87 
 In a footnote, Human Rights Watch added:
 Th e only exceptions that Human Rights Watch has made to this policy is to call for military 
intervention where massive loss of human life, on the order of genocide, can be halted 
through no other means, as was the case in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s. 88 
 Amnesty International came to a similar conclusion, although without explicitly 
adopting the  jus ad bellum/jus in bello philosophy derived from the law of armed 
confl ict. According to Amnesty International, the organization 
 84  ECtHR,  Kononov v Latvia [GC], no 36376/04, Judgment, 17 May 2010. 
 85  Article 1(4) of AP I. 
 86  ICJ,  Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion , ICJ Reports 1996, 226, § 97. 
 87  Human Rights Watch, ‘Memorandum for the Sixth Session of the Assembly of States Parties of the 
International Criminal Court’. 
 88  Human Rights Watch (n 87). 
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 has not taken a position on the defi nition of the crime of aggression because its mandate—to 
campaign for every person to enjoy all of the human rights (civil and political and economic, 
social and cultural rights) enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
international human rights standards—does not extend to the lawfulness of the use of force. 89 
 Despite these pronouncements by infl uential organizations, it is not apparent 
that the approach to  jus ad bellum that features in the law of armed confl ict should 
be transposed into the analysis undertaken pursuant to international human rights 
law when violations of the right to life are concerned. 
 Th e fi rst stumbling block is represented by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights itself, which constitutes the authoritative statement of human rights norms 
within an organization, the United Nations, premised on the illegality of the resort 
to force. Th e Universal Declaration cannot be dissociated from the Charter of the 
United Nations; rather it must be interpreted in such a manner as to reconcile its 
provisions with those of the Charter, and the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations. Surely this explains the fi rst sentence of the preamble to the Universal 
Declaration with its reference to ‘peace in the world’ and the allusion, in the second 
sentence, to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s concept of ‘freedom from fear’ (the reference 
also appears in the preambles to the two International Covenants). In his January 
1941 speech, Roosevelt explained the notion’s content: ‘Th e fourth is freedom from 
fear—which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of arma-
ments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in 
a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbour—any-
where in the world.’ Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
affi  rms: ‘Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.’ In his commentary 
on Article 28 of the Universal Declaration, Asbjørn Eide wrote:  ‘It does not take 
much refl ection to recognize that violence and war negatively aff ect the enjoyment 
of human rights. A social and political order in which all the rights in the Universal 
Declaration could be enjoyed would be possible only if there were peace on both the 
international and the national levels.’ 90 
 Th e relevance of peace to the application of human rights treaties was affi  rmed 
by the Human Rights Committee in its fi rst General Comment on the right to life:
 Th e Committee observes that war and other acts of mass violence continue to be a scourge 
of humanity and take the lives of thousands of innocent human beings every year. Under the 
Charter of the United Nations the threat or use of force by any State against another State, 
except in exercise of the inherent right of self-defence, is already prohibited. Th e Committee 
considers that States have the supreme duty to prevent wars, acts of genocide and other acts 
 89  Amnesty International, ‘International Criminal Court, Concerns at the Seventh Session of the 
Assembly of States Parties’, October 2008, Index: IOR 40/022/2008, 22. 
 90  A. Eide, ‘Article 28’, in A. Gudmundur and A. Eide (eds),  Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 620. 
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of mass violence causing arbitrary loss of life. Every eff ort they make to avert the danger of 
war, especially thermonuclear war, and to strengthen international peace and security would 
constitute the most important condition and guarantee for the safeguarding of the right to 
life. In this respect, the Committee notes, in particular, a connection between article 6 and 
article 20, which states that the law shall prohibit any propaganda for war (para. 1) or 
incitement to violence (para. 2) as therein described. 91 
 Th e ‘right to peace’ is expressly recognized in the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: ‘All peoples shall have the right to national and international peace 
and security’. 92 Th e UN Human Rights Council has adopted several resolutions 
on the promotion of ‘the peoples’ right to peace’. 93 Most recently, it has spoken of 
the ‘right to peace’ without qualifying this as a ‘peoples’ right’. 94 Th e Council was 
divided, with countries of the global south by and large voting in favour, while those 
of the north were opposed. On both sides, there seems to be no great clarity about 
what this right entails. Moreover, the entire concept of ‘peoples’ rights’ is contested 
by some experts. 95 
 If human rights law enshrines a right to peace, even implicitly, then it is logical to 
consider that a threat to peace could result in an ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of the right 
to life. If the confl ict itself is unlawful, resulting from an act of aggression, then the 
deaths of those who are attacked that result are arbitrary. Th e problem is perhaps 
more acute with civilian victims, for whom there is little solace in suggesting that 
human rights law takes no position on the legality of the use of force. In the law of 
armed confl ict it is rather common to speak of ‘collateral damage’ in describing the 
loss of life (and property) of non-combatants who unfortunately happen to be in 
the line of fi re. Modern treaty law proscribes ‘an attack which may be expected to 
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, 
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated’. 96 Th e collateral death of those who do not 
participate in the confl ict is tolerated by the law of armed confl ict, as long as it is 
actually the military objectives that are targetted, and to the extent that limitations 
imposed by proportionality are respected. Human rights law may provide a diff erent 
answer, one that better addresses the rights of victims, precisely because it does not 
stand indiff erent to the arbitrariness that lies behind the use of force. It should be 
said that while the victimization of non-combatants may be at the centre of concerns 
 91  ‘General Comment 6’, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Add.1, § 2. See also ‘General Comment 14’, § 2. 
 92  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1986) 1520 UNTS 217, art 23(1). 
 93  ‘Promotion of the right of peoples to peace’, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/8/9; ‘Promotion of the right 
of peoples to peace’, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/11/4; ‘Promotion of the right of peoples to peace’, UN Doc 
A/HRC/RES/14/3; ‘Promotion of the right of peoples to peace’, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/16. 
 94  ‘Promotion of the right to peace’, UN Doc A/HRC/20/15. 
 95  P. Alston, ‘Introduction’, in P. Alston (ed),  Peoples’ Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
1–6 at 1. 
 96  Article 51(5)(b) of AP I. 
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in this respect, members of the armed forces who are victims of an unlawful attack 
may also suff er breaches of the right to life. 
 Although the law of armed confl ict addresses the proportionality of the measures 
employed in an attack in assessing whether the levels of collateral damage are toler-
able, human rights law has also confronted the issue. Th e European Court of Human 
Rights has considered the problem of incidental loss of civilian life in cases dealing 
with the civil war in the Russian territory of Chechnya. It has steered clear of any 
attempt to apply international humanitarian law, or to articulate the principles gov-
erning the relationship it may have with human rights law. Th e European Court 
seems to have found an entirely adequate legal framework within human rights law, 
without the need to resort to a  lex specialis theory, in contrast with the approach 
taken by the International Court of Justice. In one case before the European Court, 
a bomb dropped by a Russian plane had exploded near the mini-van of the appli-
cant and her relatives as they were fl eeing the village of Katyr-Yurt through what 
they had perceived as a safe exit from heavy fi ghting. 97 In another, bombs were 
dropped on a civilian convoy at the border between Chechnya and Ingushetia. 
Russian authorities had issued a press statement denying civilian damage, claiming 
that a column of trucks with fi ghters and ammunition had provoked the encounter 
by fi ring upon a government aircraft . 98 According to the Court, Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights ‘covers not only intentional killing but also 
the situations in which it is permitted to “use force” which may result, as an unin-
tended outcome, in the deprivation of life’. 99 Th e test to be applied in considering the 
exceptions to the right to life in time of confl ict, said the Court, was one of ‘absolute 
necessity’; the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the 
permitted aims. 100 Nevertheless, in a situation of armed confl ict ‘the obligation to 
protect the right to life must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an 
impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities’. 101 
 In the Katyr-Yurt case, the Court said 
 the State’s responsibility was not confi ned to circumstances where there was signifi cant 
evidence that misdirected fi re from agents of the state has killed a civilian. It may also be 
engaged where they fail to take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods 
 97  ECtHR,  Isayeva v Russia , no 57950/00, Judgment, 24 February 2005. 
 98  ECtHR,  Isayeva, Yusopova and Bazaye va  v Russia , nos 57947/00, 57948/00, and 57949/00, 
Judgment, 24 February 2005, § 32. 
 99  ECtHR,  Isayeva v Russia , no 57950/00, Judgment, 24 February 2005, § 173; ECtHR,  Isayeva, 
Yusopova and Bazaye va  v Russia , nos 57947/00, 57948/00, and 57949/00, Judgment, 24 February 
2005, § 169. 
 100  See cases at n 99. Also, ECtHR,  Akhmadov et al v Russia , no 21586/02, Judgment, 14 November 
2008, §§ 92, 94. 
 101  ECtHR,  Akhmadov et al v Russia , no 21586/02, Judgment, 14 November 2008, § 97;  Albekov et al 
v Russia , no 68216/01, Judgment, 9 October 2008, § 79;  Arzu Akhmadova et al v Russia , no 13670/03, 
Judgment, 8 January 2009, § 163. 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Dec 04 2013, NEWGEN
15_Clapham_ch15.indd   383 12/4/2013   3:52:33 PM
384   THE RIGHT TO LIFE
of a security operation mounted against an opposing group with a view to avoiding and, in 
any event, minimising, incidental loss of civilian life. 102 
 In the case of the bombing of the convoy on the Chechnya-Ingushetia border, the 
Court said:
 Th e situation that existed in Chechnya at the relevant time called for exceptional measures 
on behalf of the State in order to regain control over the Republic and to suppress the illegal 
armed insurgency. Th ese measures could presumably include employment of military avia-
tion equipped with heavy combat weapons. Th e Court is also prepared to accept that if the 
planes were attacked by illegal armed groups, that could have justifi ed use of lethal force, 
thus falling within paragraph 2 of Article 2. 103 
 Th e Court has also held that Article 2 of the Convention—the right to life—imposes 
a positive duty on the state to locate and deactivate mines, to mark and seal off  
mined areas so as to prevent anyone from freely entering them, and to provide com-
prehensive warnings concerning mines laid in the vicinity of non-combatants. 104 
 Th e European Court of Human Rights pointed out in the Katyr-Yurt case that 
Russia had not declared martial law or a state of emergency in Chechnya, and that 
no derogation had been formulated in accordance with Article 15 of the European 
Convention. As a result, the situation had to be judged ‘against a normal legal back-
ground’. 105 According to the Court, ‘the use of aviation bombs in a populated area, 
outside wartime and without prior evacuation of the civilians, is impossible to rec-
oncile with the degree of caution expected from a law-enforcement body in a demo-
cratic society’. 106 Th us, although the Court accepted that the military operation in 
Katyr-Yurt was pursuing a ‘legitimate aim’, it could not accept that it was planned 
and executed with the requisite care for the lives of the civilian population. 107 
 In the border convoy case, the Court did not repeat the same caveat about ‘nor-
mal legal background’ and the absence of a declaration of martial law. It said that 
‘even assuming that the military were pursuing a legitimate aim in launching 12 S-24 
non-guided air-to-ground missiles on 29 October 1999, the Court does not accept 
that the operation near the village of Shaami-Yurt was planned and executed with 
the requisite care for the lives of the civilian population’. 108 In another case involving 
an attack on civilians fl eeing Grozny by way of what they had been led to believe was 
a safe humanitarian corridor, the Court rapidly concluded there had been a violation 
of the right to life, absent any attempt by Russia to justify the military action. 109 
 102  ECtHR,  Isayeva v Russia , no 57950/00, Judgment, 24 February 2005, § 176. 
 103  ECtHR,  Isayeva, Yusopova and Bazaye va  v Russia , nos 57947/00, 57948/00, and 57949/00, 
Judgment, 24 February 2005, § 178. 
 104  ECtHR,  Albekov et al v Russia , no 68216/01, Judgment, 9 October 2008, § 90. 
 105  ECtHR,  Isayeva v Russia , no 57950/00, Judgment, 24 February 2005, § 191. 
 106  ECtHR,  Isayeva v Russia , no 57950/00, Judgment, 24 February 2005, § 191. 
 107  ECtHR,  Isayeva v Russia , no 57950/00, Judgment, 24 February 2005, § 200. 
 108  ECtHR,  Isayeva, Yusopova and Bazaye va  v Russia , nos 57947/00, 57948/00, and 57949/00, 
Judgment, 24 February 2005, § 199. 
 109  ECtHR,  Umayeva v Russia , no  1200/03 , Judgment, 4 December 2008, §§ 82–3. 
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 None of the European Court cases concerning armed confl ict have found that the 
respondent state failed to demonstrate a ‘legitimate aim’. In the Chechen jurispru-
dence, the Court accepted that Russia was entitled to repress a secessionist movement. 
Th us, its fi ndings were confi ned to the rules of  jus in bello . Th e argument that killing 
of non-combatants in a confl ict conducted in violation of international law, that is, 
contrary to  jus ad bellum , would be per se contrary to the European Convention, 
regardless of issues of necessity and proportionality, remains to be considered by 
the Court. If it is, the  lex specialis approach of the International Court of Justice will 
likely be invoked by the respondent state to suggest the issue is irrelevant. But, as 
explained above, there is much to support the view that human rights law diff ers 
in one fundamental aspect from the law of armed confl ict: killing that results from 
resort to illegal war and acts of aggression is  prima facie a violation of the human 
right to life. 
 5  Conclusion  
 ‘[P] eace is the underlying condition for the full observance of human rights and 
war is their negation.’ 110 Th ese words begin the Resolution adopted at the 1968 
Tehran Conference on human rights that is regularly cited as the point of departure 
of eff orts to reconcile the law of armed confl ict with human rights law. Th e UN 
Secretary-General, in his fi rst report on human rights and armed confl ict, said: 
‘Th e Second World War gave conclusive proof of the close relationship which 
exists between outrageous behaviour of a Government towards its own citizens and 
aggression against other nations, thus, between respect for human rights and the 
maintenance of peace.’ 111 Somehow, over time, the primacy of peace within the over-
all philosophy of human rights law has become blurred. Perhaps this is due to a 
certain infatuation with the use of armed force to prevent human rights violations. 
Th is oft en appears in the guise of fi ne slogans like ‘humanitarian intervention’ and 
the ‘responsibility to protect’, but in practice seems to degenerate inexorably into the 
atrocities of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. Th at resort to armed force may be nec-
essary to prevent human rights violations cannot be ruled out, but nor should its 
benefi ts be exaggerated. As a general rule, it is a case of killing the patient to cure 
the illness, as we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Another explanation for the 
 110  Resolution XXIII ‘Human Rights in Armed Confl icts’ adopted by the International Conference 
on Human Rights, Tehran, 12 May 1968. 
 111  Respect for human rights in armed confl icts, UN Doc A/7720, § 16, 
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marginalization of peace within the overall vision of human rights may be a 
consequence of the growing insistence upon international justice. Peace is oft en 
held up as a counterweight to justice. Some enthusiasts for justice take an absolute 
view, where there is no room to balance peace with individual accountability. 
 Th e conclusion of the June 2010 Kampala Review Conference provides a helpful 
correction, repositioning the ultimate atrocity, aggressive war, within the realm of 
international criminality. Th e Conference adopted, by consensus, a defi nition of 
the crime of aggression and modalities for prosecution that allow the Court to pro-
ceed even in the absence of a determination or authorization from the UN Security 
Council. 112 Th e message of the Nuremberg trial is revived: war is the ‘supreme inter-
national crime diff ering only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself 
the accumulated evil of the whole’. 113 Th e International Military Tribunal did not 
use the language of human rights law, which only really emerged in the months 
and years following its judgment of the Nazi criminals. Th e judges might well have 
said that ‘war is the supreme violation of the right to life’. Protection of the right 
to life requires the prohibition of aggressive war, and of the resort to force for the 
settlement of international disputes. Th at the law of armed confl ict does not speak 
directly to the prohibition of war is a consequence of its unique mission which 
involves the regulation of behaviour on the battlefi eld. Human rights law need 
observe no such limitation. 
 112  ‘Th e Crime of Aggression’, RC/Res.6. 
 113  France et al v Göring et al (1948) 22 IMT 427. 
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